Tire Purchaser’s Standing Argument Fails to Gain Traction with the Third Circuit

A few weeks ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc.,^[1] a case involving the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 that require tire dealers to assist buyers with registering their newly purchased tires with the manufacturer.^[2] The statute’s implementing regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 574.8, provides several ways for tire dealers to comply with their registration obligations, including furnishing buyers with registration forms and sending their registration information to the manufacturer. The issue before the court was whether a buyer has standing to sue a tire dealer who fails to comply with the regulation.

In early 2017, Vickie Thorne bought a pair of tires from a Pep Boys store in Richmond, Virginia.^[3] According to Thorne, Pep Boys neither provided her with the requisite registration forms nor submitted her contact information to the manufacturer.^[4] Thorne then filed a class action against Pep Boys in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting both federal and state law claims.^[5] Pep Boys moved to dismiss her complaint, arguing that Thorne lacked standing.^[6]

Standing refers to the ability of a litigant to bring a claim. One of the requirements of standing is “injury-in-fact.”^[7] To meet this requirement, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered a harm to a “legally protected interest.” Such a harm must be “particularized” and “concrete,” i.e., “it must actually exist.”^[8] Although tangible harms, such as economic losses, are usually concrete, intangible harms can be too, as long as they are “real” and “not abstract.”^[9] Future harms can also suffice if they are “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”^[10]

In her complaint, Thorne alleged two harms. First, she contended that Pep Boys, by neglecting to assist her with the registration of her tires, caused her tangible, economic harm.^[11] Since unregistered tires are worth less than registered tires, Thorne argued, and she had assumed that the sale of the tires complied with federal law, she had not received the benefit of her bargain.^[12] Second, Thorne claimed that Pep Boys’ failure to comply with its registration obligations increased the risk that she would be harmed by potential defects in the tires.^[13] In the event of a recall, she contended, the fact that her tires were not registered would make it more difficult for the manufacturer to contact her, and thus more likely that she would be injured by a defect.^[14]

The rubber hit the road, however, when the district court granted Pep Boys’ motion to dismiss, holding that Thorne lacked standing.^[15] Thorne appealed. An unanimous three-judge panel of the Third Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that Thorne had failed to establish injury-in-fact.^[16] First, as to Thorne’s alleged tangible harm, the court concluded that Thorne had received the benefit of her bargain because she did not rely on any misrepresentation about registration assistance and “unalleged, uncertain future events do not make her Pep Boys tires worth less at the time of purchase than equivalent registered tires.”^[17]

Second, the court concluded that Thorne had failed to allege a concrete, intangible injury.^[18] The court explained that for an intangible harm to be concrete, it must be closely related to a traditional common-law injury or Congress must have elevated the loss to a legally cognizable harm.^[19] According to the court, however, Thorne had failed to identify a historical analogue to Pep Boys’ alleged failure to assist her with registering her tires.^[20] And after analyzing the text and legislative history of the statute, the court was “persuade[d] that Congress did not intend to give private attorneys general standing to redress the ‘injury’ of unregistered tires.”^[21]

And even assuming that Thorne had alleged an intangible yet concrete harm, the court concluded that the harm was not imminent or likely.^[22] The court noted that to constitute an injury in fact, the threatened injury must be “certainly impending” and there must be a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur.^[23] According to the court, “Thorne posits only an infinitesimal increase in her chances of being injured because of Pep Boys’ failure to register her tires, so any risk of harm—even if concrete—is no more than speculative.”^[24]

In sum, although the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence is complicated, the outcome in Thorne suggests that, on the ground, courts are able to apply the doctrine in a straightforward, pragmatic manner, thereby “weed[ing] out claims” like Thorne’s “that are nothing more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.”^[25] Since not all alleged injuries will be as abstract and speculative as Thorne’s, however, tire dealers and other venders should tread carefully to comply with federal and state laws that require them to take additional measures to ensure customer safety.

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^[1] No. 20-1540, 2020 WL 6814573 (3d Cir. Nov. 20, 2020).

^[2] 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq.

^[3] 2020 WL 6814573, at *2.

^[4] Id.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

^[8] Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

^[9] Id. at 1549.

^[10] Id. at 1548.

^[11] 2020 WL 6814573, at *2

^[12] Id.

^[13] Id.

^[14] Id.

^[15] See Thorne v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack Inc., No. CV 19-393, 2020 WL 605876, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2020).

^[16] 2020 WL 6814573, at *11.

^[17] Id. at *10.

^[18] Id. at *7.

^[19] Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).

^[20] Id. at *7-8.

^[21] Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added).

^[22] Id. at *9-10.

^[23] Id. at *10 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013)).

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688–89 (1973)).